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The Corporate Income Tax 
  
Since the adoption of the United States 
Constitution endowing Congress with the power to 
“…lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and 
excises, pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States” 
in 1789 (art. I, §8, cl. 1), spirited and evolutionary 
debate has focused on the manners in which the 
government should collect revenues and monitor 
citizens’ compliance with those manners. Though 
the underlying purpose of the U.S. taxation system 
is of course to collect revenue for use in 
government-directed programs, the specific sources 
of wealth that have been subject to – or not subject 
to – taxation have been chosen in part to encourage 
social, economic and political initiatives of national 
and state governments with due consideration 
toward the fairness of the system itself and the 
economic burden that different taxes place on 
various classes of citizens. Today, taxpayers are 
subject to a complex, nuanced and unwieldy tax 
code: According to a report released on Aug. 27, 
2010 by the President’s Economic Recovery 
Advisory Board, American taxpayers spend 7.6 
billion hours and roughly $140 billion a year to 
comply with federal tax regulations (Montgomery). 
 Until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1861, 
government revenues were collected exclusively 
through tariffs, sales and property taxes (U.S. 
Treasury 2010). In 1862, the government first 
levied a tax on personal income using a system 
conceptually not far removed from the one used 
today. Employers withheld taxes, deductions were 
permitted and higher incomes were taxed at a 
greater rate than lower incomes. The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled such a system unconstitutional in 1895 
(Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.) on the 
basis that certain of these taxes could be classified 
as “direct,” thereby violating Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution: “Representatives and direct Taxes 
shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers…” (art. I, 
§2, cl. 3). 
The taxation of corporations began in 1909 
with the passage of the corporate excise tax as part 
of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act. The act applied 
definitions of taxable income and tax rates to the 
corporation without regard to the status of its 
owners. 
The corporate excise tax was able to come to 
fruition in advance of the Sixteenth Amendment 
because it was considered to be an excise, indirect 
tax and thus not prohibited by Article 1, §9 of the 
Constitution. In the early part of the twentieth 
century, most corporations distributed virtually all 
of their profits as dividends, and so the corporate 
tax at its inception primarily took the form of 
withholdings on dividends. In addition to being a 
source of revenue when individual taxes were 
disallowed, the act of taxing corporations instead of 
individuals had administrative benefits: “Because 
of its regular and open distribution of dividends, the 
corporation was an obvious target for an expansion 
of stoppage-at-the-source collection efforts that had 
proven so successful during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. In effect, the corporate tax was 
thought to be a necessary mechanism for enforcing 
a comprehensive scheme of individual income 
taxation” (Bank, 452). The principal method of 
enforcing personal income tax compliance during 
the era had been to require taxpayers to sign an oath 
swearing to the accuracy of the return (Bank, 519); 
tax assessors were usually elected by the local 
taxpayers and did not always act in the interest of 
the government, so evasion was rampant. Because 
corporate dividends were often distributed 
regularly, formally and publicly according to state 
corporation laws, withholding taxes on their 
distribution provided a convenient method of 
collecting revenue in such a way that the unpopular 
and controversial inquisition into the private 
matters of individuals was not necessary. 
Today, the relative administrative advantages 
of collecting taxes from corporations are less 
compelling than they were a century ago. 
Information technology advances have made 
employee withholdings automated. Moreover, 
corporate shares are increasingly owned by pension 
funds, mutual funds and other corporations and so 
the tracking of dividend payments is not as 
straightforward as it was in the days of paper stock 
certificates. Reporting requirements already 
provide the IRS with data concerning wages, 
withholdings, annuity and pension payments, 
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Social Security benefits and a variety of other 
transactions affecting income and potential 
deductions. Door-to-door surveys have been 
replaced with dual-reporting systems and electronic 
filing software that improve drastically the ability 
of the IRS to verify information reported on 
individual tax returns without personal inquisition. 
Though discourse commonly treats the 
corporation – and governments, for that matter – in 
the abstract as an entity separable from the sum of 
its parts, corporations are better characterized as a 
vehicle through which individuals can organize in 
order to operate more conveniently and efficiently 
than they would as a collection of legally distinct 
parties. In 1894, Sen. Anthony Higgins (R-Del.) 
defined corporations as “but aggregations of the 
capital of individuals for joint profit, with joint 
liability and joint loss, conveniently divided into 
shares for the purposes of distribution and 
management” (Higgins). Though partnerships also 
represent a form of organization for business 
purposes, partnerships are a pass-through entity for 
taxation purposes; income, credits and deductions 
are allocated to the individuals that share ownership 
and are taxed according to the status of those 
individuals. Sole proprietorships are taxed at the 
individual level as well, but current tax reporting 
requirements make it difficult to statistically 
determine the breakdown of revenues between sole 
proprietorships and individuals. 
In 1913, Congress passed the Sixteenth 
Amendment, which gave the government the 
authority to collect income taxes without regard to 
the census of individual states. Until 1936, 
dividends were excluded from personal income and 
so corporate income was taxed only once; in 1936 
that exclusion was removed. So began the 
“considerable tension between the corporate 
income tax and the individual income tax, because 
corporations are owned, directly or indirectly, by 
individuals who (ultimately) receive a share of the 
corporations’ incomes” (IRS Data Release, 284). 
Much of this tension has centered on the so-called 
“double taxation” of corporate income: Revenues 
are taxed once as income to the corporation - at 
applicable corporate tax rates, which may, 
depending on the taxpayer, be substantially greater 
than corresponding individual rates and 
dividend/capital gains rates – and again when 
received by individual owners as dividends or 
capital gains. 
Upon passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act 
in 1909, President William Taft defended a 
corporate tax because it served as “an excise tax 
upon the privilege of doing business as an artificial 
entity and of freedom from a general partnership 
liability enjoyed by those who own the stock” 
(Taft). An official report at the time countered that 
corporations represented “normal and necessary 
forms for doing business … that hence in creating 
corporations a State should be considered as 
performing a duty rather than granting a privilege. 
[T]he property and the business of corporations … 
should be taxed with no exceptional machinery” 
(Report). 
Today, corporate taxes represent an important, 
but relatively minor source of federal funds; in 
2008, they provided 12 percent of total federal 
revenues (Tax Policy Center). Imposing a corporate 
tax allows the government to grant preferential 
treatment to certain organizations by classifying 
them as non-profit or creating tax incentives that 
affect targeted industries or types of companies. A 
more frequently cited argument for continuing to 
tax corporations, though, is that absent corporate 
taxes, the corporate form of organization itself 
might be used as a tax shelter for individuals. That 
is, individuals could shift part or all of their wealth 
into corporations and thereby enjoy a lower tax 
liability than wage employees. “As long as 
dividends were taxed as ordinary income and the 
accumulated earnings tax was strict enough, it was 
difficult to use the corporate form to shelter a great 
deal of income [prior to the corporate relief 
package of 2003 that taxes dividends at a marginal 
rate of 15% instead of at the taxpayer’s ordinary 
rate],” wrote senior specialists in economic policy 
and public finance in a 2007 report to Congress 
(Gravelle, Hungerford 2007). 
The argument that taxing corporations serves 
as a backstop for wealthy investors is based on the 
presumption that the corporate tax is paid wholly 
by shareholders, but some economists argue that 
this is not the case. In the phrasing of the 
Congressional Budget Office, “A corporation may 
write its check to the Internal Revenue Service for 
payment of the corporate income tax, but that 
money must come from somewhere: from reduced 
returns to investors in the company, lower wages to 
its workers, or higher prices that consumers pay for 
the products the company produces” (CBO 1996, 
2). Historian Bruce Bartlett observed, “The 
[corporate] tax remains a major source of revenue 
for governments at all levels and periodically draws 
the ire of tax reformers, who feel that corporations 
are not paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes – based on 
a naïve and incorrect assumption that, if 
corporations paid more, other Americans would 
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pay less” (Bartlett 1985, 1). Bartlett argues that the 
double taxation of corporate income also has a 
significant effect on the cost of equity financing 
because taxes on dividends reduce increase the cost 
of investing; this distortion may contribute to the 
decision to raise capital through debt instead of 
equity financing and incur interest expense. 
Joel Slemrod, a professor of economics at the 
University of Michigan, argues that the double 
taxation of corporate income is inefficient from a 
policy perspective (Slemrod 2004). He states that 
dividend payouts are easier to monitor and tax than 
corporate income and that corporations might be 
less likely to aggressively pursue tax shelters if tax 
savings accrue directly to shareholders and not to 
the corporation itself (21). 
Determining the true incidence of the 
corporate income tax is further complicated when 
one considers the responses of each group to the 
effects of the tax and the residual effects of those 
responses. Existing literature regarding who bears 
the incidence of corporate taxes is varied and does 
not point decisively to one conclusion over another 
(CBO 1996, 30). As recently as December 2010, 
the CBO has written that “households bear the 
burden of corporate income taxes, but the extent to 
which they bear that burden as owners of capital, 
workers, or consumers is not clear” (CBO 2010, 2). 
 
Accounting for Income Taxes 
 
Though the very first corporate taxes were 
exacted based on income as defined by accounting 
standards, it quickly became clear that the goals of 
accounting systems were divergent from those of 
taxation systems and so tax laws were developed 
that included “specific definitions of many items of 
income and deductions, and many pages specifying 
when and how to account for the items…” (IRS 
Data Release, 285).  
Though taxes are not calculated using 
financial reporting standards, corporations have to 
record the cash flow and economic effects of 
income taxes using the framework of generally 
accepted accounting principles. Because GAAP 
uses an accrual basis of accounting where revenues 
and expenses are recognized when they are 
incurred and not when cash is received or remitted 
(SFAC No. 1, 3), a corporation’s recorded income 
tax expense can frequently be markedly different 
from the sum of income tax liabilities reported to 
various regulatory agencies for a given period. 
Additionally, the range of items that qualify as 
deductions for income tax purposes differ from the 
range of items that qualify as expenses for GAAP 
reporting, so certain permanent differences between 
“book” and tax income exist that need never be 
reconciled. The manner through which companies 
have been required to communicate information 
about their obligation to pay taxes has evolved over 
the past century; currently, companies record a 
“current” liability or asset that corresponds to the 
cash amount of taxes to be paid or refunded, and a 
“deferred” liability or asset representing future 
taxable income or future deductions from income 
that have been recorded in the company’s GAAP 
financial statements but will not be considered a 
taxable event until a future period (ASC 740-10-25-
2). 
For example, corporations are permitted to use 
accelerated cost recovery methods for tax purposes 
that allocate depreciation deductions/expense 
differently than methods typically followed under 
GAAP. While the sum total of depreciation for a 
given asset will ultimately be the same under both 
methods when all years are considered, the 
depreciation for any individual year will likely be 
different under each system. Other areas where 
temporary differences frequently occur include the 
provision for bad debts, pension contributions, 
unearned revenue and the carry-forward or carry-
back effects of tax losses. Substantial book-tax 
differences can arise for companies with 
subsidiaries, since the IRS uses different 
consolidation rules than GAAP. Temporary and 
permanent differences are currently outlined to the 
IRS using Schedule M-3. 
Publicly-traded corporations have an 
obligation to shareholders to maximize income and 
create wealth. Reducing tax expense has an 
immediate effect on bottom-line profitability and 
corporations therefore have an interest in 
minimizing tax expense. In the short term, it is 
possible for corporations to keep taxable income 
low while keeping reported net income high 
through the careful use of accounting techniques 
that defer taxable income and take advantage of 
preferential tax treatments. Research suggests, 
though, that firms cannot permanently sustain large 
book-tax differences without being aggressive and 
potentially risking IRS adjustments upon audit 
(Mills 1998, 355). 
Many corporations are proactive in making 
business decisions that avoid the realization of 
taxable income. These corporations create tax 
savings by shifting income into low-tax 
jurisdictions and take advantage of existing 
deductions, tax credits and organizational structures 
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that entail a preferential tax status. The term “tax 
planning” can refer to the collective effort of 
management to consciously minimize tax expense 
through elective decisions. Though firms of all 
kinds – as well as individuals – can engage in tax 
planning at some level, a 2009 study using data 
from 1998 finds that the companies which manage 
and measure their tax departments as profit centers 
versus firms that view their tax department 
primarily as a cost center tend to be larger and often 
yield lower effective tax rates and higher 
coordination between departments (Robinson et. al. 
2009, 24-25). A corporation’s effective tax rate is 
most often calculated by dividing accrued income 
tax expense by pretax income from continuing 
operations. 
 Most firms are interested primarily in reducing 
accrual, not cash, tax expense (Robinson et. al. 
2009, 30). A possible reason for this behavior is 
that executives tend to be compensated based on 
after-tax GAAP earnings. Additionally, because the 
cash payment for taxes for any given tax year is not 
publicly available, accrual tax expense tends to be 
the most convenient measurement of a firm’s tax 
performance for investors. Though cash outflows 
related to taxes are separately identified in the 
statement of cash flows, this number may represent 
years of back taxes or prepayments in addition to 
the current year tax bill. 
 Appendix B illustrates selected tax 
information of General Electric Company for 2008-
2010. GE’s reported 2010 current tax expense of $4 
million on pretax earnings of $14,208 million drew 
much attention in popular media, but the situation 
is not as simple as it might seem. First off, the 
accrual-based tax provision reported in the 
company’s income statement for 2010 was $1,050 
million – still a fairly paltry effective tax rate of 
7.39%, but a far cry from just $4 million. An 
examination of the notes to GE’s financial 
statements reveals that though the company is 
subject to the top U.S. marginal corporate tax rate 
of 35.0%, the tax effects of global operations 
reduced this rate by 25.8%. Roughly 64.3% of 
GE’s 2010 net earnings were derived from 
international operations, and a substantial portion 
of these earnings were reinvested indefinitely and 
therefore subject to tax rates of less than 35%. U.S. 
tax law currently defers the imposition of U.S. tax 
on certain active financial services income until 
that income is repatriated to the U.S. as a dividend. 
Required financial statement notes related to 
income taxes are not so detailed as to allow a 
recreation of a company’s specific transactions that 
yield current and deferred tax expenses and 
benefits, but GE’s statements demonstrate that 
accrual techniques and international tax laws can 
have a dramatic impact on a company’s current tax 
expense and therefore a more comprehensive 
understanding of tax expense is required to evaluate 
the extent to which a company effectively manages 
its tax expense. 
 In order to realize actual net tax savings, firms 
must consider both the tax and economic effects of 
a decision. For example, a firm might enjoy a lower 
marginal income tax rate by operating out of a 
certain jurisdiction, but the cost of constructing a 
plant and transferring resources to that jurisdiction 
might well outweigh any pure tax savings. In its 
Guiding Principles of Good Tax Policy (Appendix 
A), the Tax Division of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants writes, “The effect of 
the tax law on a taxpayer’s decisions as to how to 
carry out a particular transaction or whether to 
engage in a transaction should be kept to a 
minimum … That is, taxpayers should not be 
unduly encouraged or discouraged from engaging 
in certain activities or taking certain courses of 
action primarily due to the effect of the tax law on 
the activity or action.” The AICPA acknowledges, 
though, challenges that “stem from the desire to use 
the tax law for more than raising revenue, for 
instance, to implement social or economic policies” 
and notes that tradeoffs must be made among all 
the considerations of a fair tax system in order to 
create an optimal model (AICPA, 13). 
 
Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion 
  
To fully appreciate the complexities that make 
requirements like Financial Accounting Standards 
Board Interpretation No. 48 and the Schedule of 
Uncertain Tax Positions unpopular among some 
taxpayers, one must consider the difference 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion, as well as 
the difficulty of distinguishing between the two. 
Tax avoidance refers to strategically making 
business decisions that are fully legal but take 
advantage of preferential tax jurisdictions and 
treatments. For example, an individual might avoid 
incurring taxes on income by investing in tax-free 
municipal bonds, instructing an employer to deposit 
wages into a tax-free individual retirement account 
or choosing to realize capital gains only when he 
can realize losses to offset the taxable gains. Tax 
evasion, on the other hand, generally refers to 
illegally and knowingly underpaying taxes either by 
intentionally reporting taxable income incorrectly 
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or incompletely or by engaging in transactions that 
create tax losses but bear little or no economic risk. 
In the former case, issues of legality are usually 
cut-and-dry; taking a job that pays wages “under 
the table” and not reporting that income is clearly 
tax evasion. Classifying transactions that might be 
considered tax evasion on the basis that they reduce 
tax liability outside the spirit of the law, however, 
can involve a substantial level of judgment, 
especially when those transactions are made at the 
corporate level and involve complicated legal and 
financial steps. 
In some cases, corporations and in particular 
large, international firms with tax haven 
subsidiaries (Lisowsky 2010, 1711) are able to take 
advantage of tax avoidance transactions, defined by 
the U.S. Treasury as “any transaction in which the 
reasonably expected pre-tax profit … of the 
transaction are insignificant relative to the 
reasonably expected net tax benefits … of such 
transaction” (Treasury 1999, 157). The IRS 
characterizes these abusive shelters as “very 
complicated transactions that sophisticated tax 
professionals promote to corporations and wealthy 
individuals, exploiting tax loopholes and reaping 
large and unintended tax benefits” (GAO 
Testimony 2003). Nevertheless, “Under present 
law, there is no uniform standard as to what 
constitutes a tax shelter; however, there are 
statutory provisions, judicial doctrines, and 
administrative guidance that attempt to limit or 
identify transactions in which a significant purpose 
is the avoidance of evasion of income tax” (Joint 
Committee on Taxation 2002, 4). 
 Since many abusive shelters are based on legal 
tax planning techniques, it is often difficult for 
courts to distinguish legitimate tax planning efforts 
from illicit shelters (Levinsohn 2005). The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that all 
taxpayers retain the right to reduce their tax liability 
or avoid paying taxes altogether provided they do 
so within the boundaries of the law. Frequently, 
though, courts defer to the economic substance 
doctrine frequently credited to the 1934 Gregory v. 
Helvering. In this and many cases since, courts 
have found that tax savings based on literal and 
straightforward application of tax law are not 
permissible if the taxpayer realizes no economic 
benefits from entering into a transaction aside from 
the tax savings themselves. The IRS has more 
recently clarified that transactions may be legal 
even if they do not actually yield a profit as long as 
a cash flow or net present value analysis proves that 
the taxpayer could have reasonably realized a profit 
(IRS Notice 2002-50, 6-B-III). The IRS also 
advocates employing the substance over form test, 
that is, a set of transactions yielding the same end 
result should be treated in the same way for tax 
purposes regardless of the legal steps used to 
achieve that end (IRS 2002-50, 6-C). Nevertheless, 
federal courts have sometimes ruled that 
transactions are allowable even if executed 
exclusively for the purpose of realizing tax savings.  
Often, tax avoidance transactions are created 
and sold to corporations and individuals as “tax 
shelters.” The U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations found that between 
1997 and 2001, KPMG sold four “active tax 
products” to more than 350 individuals which 
generated revenues for the firm in excess of $124 
million; three of those products were later 
determined by the IRS to be potentially abusive or 
illegal tax shelters (U.S. Senate 2003, 27). In that 
2003 report, the Committee concluded that “the tax 
shelter industry as a whole remains active, 
developing new products, marketing dubious tax 
shelters to numerous individuals and corporations, 
and continuing to wrongfully deny the U.S. 
Treasury billions of dollars in revenues, leaving 
average U.S. taxpayers to make up the difference” 
(3). In a tax shelter case involving global 
accounting firm KPMG, internal emails sent by tax 
professionals demonstrated calculations showing 
that the penalties for not registering tax products 
with the IRS, thus violating federal tax shelter laws, 
would be low compared to the fees generated by 
selling the products to clients, and that registering 
the tax shelters with the IRS would place the firm at 
a competitive disadvantage (13). 
 Though methodological and data constraints 
make it difficult to estimate with certainty the 
dollar amount of potential tax revenues lost through 
the use of tax shelters, an IRS contractor estimated 
that the average between 1993 and 1999 was 
between $11.6 billion and $15.1 billion per year 
(GAO Testimony 2003, 6). The U.S. Treasury has 
expressed concern about the proliferation of 
corporate tax shelters not only because of the short-
term reduction in the corporate tax base but also 
because “corporate tax shelters breed disrespect for 
the tax system – both by the people who participate 
in the tax shelter market and by others who 
perceive unfairness” (U.S. Treasury 1999, iv). 
Additionally, the costs incurred by users and 
promoters of tax shelters to create and defend tax 
benefits are economically unproductive. For all of 
these reasons, the government has in the past 
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decade especially taken a serious interest in 
reducing the prevalence of tax shelters. 
Investors, too, can easily justify an interest in 
understanding how aggressive a particular company 
is in avoiding taxes and utilizing tax shelters. 
Public exposure of a company’s use of tax shelters 
is almost certainly a negative event – often, 
penalties and legal defense expenses are incurred, 
and there exists a public characterization of firms 
that evade taxes as poor corporate citizens. Some 
investors may also view aggressive tax behavior as 
an indicator of poor corporate governance and 
wonder if the firm is cheating not only the IRS but 
investors as well (Hanlon, Slemrod 2006, 12). On 
average, news of a corporation being involved in a 
tax shelter negatively affects that firm’s stock price, 
especially for retail firms (Hanlon, Slemrod 2006, 
5). Hanlon and Slemrod note, though, the difficulty 
of gauging the actual or perceived earnings effect 
of a tax shelter savings reversal since it is nearly 
impossible to reliably determine when a firm 
booked the savings initially and what amount of 
savings have been surrendered after exposure of the 
tax shelter since any valuation reserves would have 
been recorded in aggregate (28). Hanlon and 
Slemrod did not find a significant correlation 
between stock prices and the release of reports from 
Citizens for Tax Justice identifying firms that pay 
little or no taxes (35). 
 
Controversies Arising from Disclosing Uncertainty 
An individual tax position may involve a 
deduction or exclusion from income, the claim of a 
tax credit, the use of a carry-forward or carry-back 
loss, the classification of an entity, transfer pricing 
allocation or a number of other assertions made on 
a tax return for the purpose of minimizing income 
tax liability. Because modern tax law is complex 
and does not specifically address every conceivable 
transaction structure or situation but, like GAAP, 
institutes rules that companies must apply to their 
respective industries and circumstances, managers 
must make a conscious decision to report or not 
report certain events in a tax return where 
ambiguity exists regarding the specific application 
of regulations. 
In March 1975, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board issued Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 5, which requires firms 
to accrue a contingent liability such as income taxes 
payable if such liability is “probable” and “the 
amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated” 
(FAS 5, 8a-b). This guidance allowed substantial 
flexibility for firms to gauge materiality in their 
decision to accrue or disclose, and firms developed 
divergent policies for dealing with SFAS No. 5 
based on a variety of factors. Research indicates 
that many firms under-disclosed material claims 
and did not provide the detailed information 
required by SFAS No. 5 (Gleason and Mills 338). 
In June 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, a nongovernmental body that develops 
accounting techniques for U.S. companies, issued 
an interpretation of SFAS No. 109, which had 
established the asset-liability approach to recording 
temporary and permanent book-tax differences. 
FASB Interpretation No. 48, now a part of 
Accounting Standards Codification 740-10, 
“prescribes a recognition threshold and 
measurement attribute for the financial statement 
recognition and measurement of a tax position 
taken or expected to be taken in a tax return” (FIN 
48, Summary). 
While FIN 48 established a needed 
consistency for treating contingencies related to 
UTPs, it contains provisions that depart from the 
foundational goal of financial reporting – providing 
relevant, reliable information to third-party users of 
investors and creditors – in favor of an idealistic 
model that assumes companies will remit all 
possible taxes to all possible collecting agencies 
even when the practical likelihood of such an 
occurrence is remote. FIN 48 caters to another 
third-party user that stands to benefit from the 
profitability of corporations: the government, and 
by extension, all who benefit from the expenditures 
of government. In effect, FIN 48 asks corporations 
to audit themselves for tax compliance and then 
publicize a hypothetical income tax liability that is 
likely different from the one the company has 
proposed to the Internal Revenue Service under the 
voluntary reporting system addressed in Flora v. 
United States; in that case, the Supreme Court 
noted that “our system of taxation is based upon 
voluntary assessment and payment, not upon 
distraint” (362 U.S. 167) Normally, both individual 
and corporate taxpayers are permitted to assess 
their own tax liability using the instructional tools 
made available by the IRS and state and local 
governments with the understanding that their self-
evaluation may be audited for completeness and 
accuracy and that penalties, interest and potentially 
criminal sanctions can be imposed if the original 
return is found to underreport tax liability and 
sufficient disclosure has not provided to apprise the 
regulatory agency of the taxpayer’s uncertainty in 
taking the positions in question. Though the public 
has always had a justified interest in preventing 
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outright tax evasion, FIN 48 potentially serves as a 
disincentive to corporations seeking to implement 
tax savings strategies in that it exposes those 
strategies to regulators who are interested in 
collecting maximal revenue. 
Beginning in 2011, companies will face even 
further disclosure requirements: The largest U.S. 
corporations will be required to submit a completed 
Schedule of Uncertain Tax Positions (Form 1120) 
to the IRS. Schedule UTP requires companies to 
list all uncertain tax positions being taken in that 
year’s return as well as in prior years’ returns from 
2010 onward and, for each listed UTP, to indicate 
whether the UTP represents a permanent or 
temporary difference and whether the UTP 
represents a “major” position, defined as 10 percent 
or greater of the total amount of UTP reserves. 
Corporations are also required to rank the UTPs 
based on the size of the associated reserves. 
Although the requirements of Schedule UTP for the 
most part build upon the analysis prescribed by FIN 
48, the instructions also indicate that a taxpayer 
“must report on Schedule UTP a tax position taken 
on its return for which no reserve for income tax is 
recorded if the tax position is one which the 
corporation or a related party determines the 
probability of settling with the IRS to be less than 
50 percent and, under applicable accounting 
standards, no reserve was recorded in the audited 
financial statements because the corporation 
intends to litigate the tax position and has 
determined that it is more likely than not to prevail 
on the merits in the litigation” (Schedule UTP, 
Instructions). That is, taxpayers must identify to the 
IRS any position that is likely to be technically 
objectionable even if they, their legal counsel and 
their independent auditors believe the position will 
likely be sustained in court. 
FIN 48 and Schedule UTP have substantially 
heightened disclosure requirements related to 
corporate income taxes and the effects of each on 
individual corporations are contingent on the 
company’s attitude toward and usage of tax 
planning in its overall business strategy. The 
requirements will most likely have a meaningful 
effect on the extent to which companies can lower 
their effective tax rates as part of a general profit-
creating strategy. Additionally, the IRS will be 
provided with information that can be used in 
guiding decisions including whether to audit a 
corporate taxpayer and which positions, if any, to 
challenge. Though the end result of the 
requirements for investors is potentially a more 
consistent and relevant set of income tax 
information than has been previously available, it 
may come at the expense of increased effective tax 
rates. Many corporations implement tax 
management policies that attempt to maximize 
profits while minimizing reported tax expense. FIN 
48 in some cases raises the reported income tax 
expense by requiring companies to derecognize tax 
benefits that would otherwise reduce tax expense. 
Businesses with an interest in achieving maximum 
tax compliance will likely face less of an impact 
from FIN 48 and Schedule UTP than businesses 
interested in minimizing tax exposure; their 
conservatism may actually be advantageous in 
reducing the likelihood of an IRS audit because the 
disclosure requirements allow them to credibly 
show a high level of confidence in their tax return. 
Some tax-aggressive firms may refuse to admit or 
disclose uncertainty at all; the responsibility of 
ensuring the integrity of reported uncertainty will 
now fall on independent auditors to uphold. 
The broader notion that the government is now 
demanding identification of UTPs is concerning to 
many corporate taxpayers. Though the government 
must necessarily draw funding from private 
resources through taxation in order to provide 
services to a public comprised of private 
individuals, the United States was founded on the 
principle that the government ought to carry out its 
operations with the consent of the public. 
The FASB stated in the basis for its conclusions on 
FIN 48: “Some constituents asserted that requiring 
a tabular reconciliation is not appropriate because it 
would inappropriately provide a ‘roadmap’ for 
taxing authorities. Those constituents analogized 
the relationship between a taxpayer and a taxing 
authority to the parties in a lawsuit … A 
counterparty in a lawsuit is acting in the broader 
public interest in regulating compliance with self-
reporting income tax laws” (B64). While that 
statement is not incorrect, a taxing authority is 
privy to developing internal policies, interpretations 
and methods that diverge from a totally neutral 
reading of tax law and should not be treated as a 
pinnacle of objectivity and fairness. Political, 
societal and other pressures have the propensity to 
affect the IRS just as they do the FASB and public 
representatives. 
Though it is in the public’s interest for the IRS 
to deter noncompliance and tax evasion at both the 
individual and entity level, the public similarly has 
an interest in being able to continue to use the 
corporate form of organization to conduct business 
free of unfair and undue government intervention. 
“All businesses want lower taxes. But businesses 
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understand that their success as businesses depends 
in part on what the government does – on 
education, infrastructure, national security … Most 
businesses understand that we have limited 
resources, that we can’t raise taxes on individuals 
to lower business taxes and that unsustainable long-
term deficits hurt growth too,” offered Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner in an interview 
following President Barack Obama’s 2011 State of 
the Union address that suggested a future reduction 
in U.S. corporate tax rates (Wessel 2011). 
In requiring corporations to report the 
technical results of an imprecise, broadly-conceived 
accounting test, the IRS is opening the door to a 
troubling environment where corporations with 
uncertain tax positions are subject to a game of 
courtroom ‘gotcha’ – the IRS can use Schedule 
UTP disclosures to identify tax benefits that are 
properly determined to be uncertain because 
relevant tax law is not easily or directly applicable 
to the event in question, and then use the very fact 
that the taxpayer reported such uncertainty to sway 
the court’s opinion or pressure the taxpayer into a 
settlement. While it is of course entirely plausible 
that the IRS might indeed use enhanced disclosure 
solely to increase efficiency and to resolve disputes 
quickly, there exist at this time no clear 
mechanisms to protect the taxpayer from this type 
of underhanded government action. 
 
Current GAAP for Recognizing UTPs in 
Financial Statements 
 
 FASB Interpretation No. 48 became effective 
as part of U.S. GAAP for fiscal years beginning 
after Dec. 15, 2006 and is currently incorporated 
into ASC 740. Under ASC 740-10, firms must 
evaluate each tax position to determine whether it is 
more likely than not to be sustained upon 
examination based on technical merit (740-10-55-
3). Taxpayers may consider in this evaluation 
whether they would litigate or appeal an adverse 
judgment, but they are to presume that the 
appropriate taxing authorities have “full knowledge 
of all relevant information.” Detection risk is 
ignored in the assessment of whether a position will 
be sustained, but widely understood administrative 
practices may be considered (e.g., for the sake of 
convenience the IRS typically ignores certain 
deviations from tax law such as the deduction of 
assets below a taxpayer-determined dollar amount) 
so that a company can record a related tax benefit 
even though the position technically would not be 
sustained if challenged (740-10-55-90). If any 
position meets the More-Likely-Than-Not 
threshold, then the benefit of the position 
recognized in the financial statements should be as 
large as possible provided that amount is More-
Likely-Than-Not to be realized upon settlement. 
Tax effects are recorded as reductions or additions 
to income taxes payable or as deferred tax assets or 
liabilities in accordance with SFAS No. 109. The 
recognition or non-recognition status of tax 
positions can change as the MLTN analysis is 
applied in subsequent financial reporting periods 
(740-10-35-3). 
 If a taxpayer takes positions on a tax return or 
expects to do so but those positions do not meet the 
MLTN threshold, the taxpayer must accrue 
appropriate interest and penalties related to those 
positions under ASC 740-10. ASC 740-10-25-56 
requires that this interest be expensed separately of 
general income tax expense. In the notes to the 
financial statements, companies are required to 
report the potential changes in the status of 
unrecognized tax benefits, benefits related to UTPs 
that are taken in a tax return but not recorded 
because they fail the two-part FIN 48 test (740-10-
50-15d). Publicly traded companies are additionally 
required to disclose changes in the gross amount of 
unrecognized tax benefits as well as the amount of 
unrecognized tax benefits that are realized because 
the statute of limitations has expired for those 
positions (740-10-50-15A). 
 Taxpayers must derecognize any and all tax 
benefits that do not meet the MLTN threshold. A 
valuation allowance is not permissible if 
established solely because the sustainability of the 
position is in question. This is significant in that the 
potential value of any tax benefits that fail the 
MLTN test are completely absent from the 
consolidated financial statements. Even though any 
potential tax benefit with a sustainability 
probability greater than zero theoretically holds 
some value to the company, many of these benefits 
are confined to the notes to the financial statements 
under ASC 740-10. If ultimately never challenged, 
the income effects of non-MLTN tax benefits will 
not be realized until all relevant statutes of 
limitations expire; this ordinarily takes at least three 
years starting from the end of the tax year in 
question. 
 
Accounting Implications and Complexities 
 
 The most challenging component of FIN 48 
from an accounting standpoint is probably the 
charge to evaluate every tax position for 
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sustainability upon examination. Retaining experts 
in tax law can be prohibitively expensive for small 
and medium-sized companies, and unreasonably 
costly for large corporations that have to contend 
with a multitude of potentially taxable events and a 
variety of operating jurisdictions, each with its own 
set of laws. ASC 740-10 requires tax positions to be 
evaluated for each “unit of account,” the most 
specific level at which taxpayers accumulate 
information to support the tax return and at which it 
anticipates a taxing authority will address the issue 
(740-10-55-85). The Codification illustrates, for 
example, a scenario where a research credit taken 
on a tax return might represent the cumulative tax 
effect of four separate research projects that are 
individually and separately substantial in scope; if 
documentation exists for each project, then each of 
the four projects would be tested using FIN 48 
versus testing the aggregate research credit only. 
Each unit of account is tested ignoring the potential 
canceling or amplifying effects of interrelated tax 
positions. The determination of what constitutes a 
unit of account is subjective and dependent on 
relevant facts and circumstances. 
 Accountants also must deal with the difficult 
problem of trying to develop an empirical 
probability that a tax position will be approved 
upon examination. Many tax positions are widely 
accepted and clearly defendable using tax literature 
and case law, but large companies in particular are 
likely to find themselves wanting to take tax 
positions that are more problematic. It can be 
difficult in the latter case to quantitatively 
benchmark the likelihood that the IRS or another 
regulatory agency will accept a tax position when 
tax law does not yield an obvious conclusion and 
precedent is either nonexistent or not directly 
comparable to the situation at hand. FIN 48 does 
not prescribe a specific method of coming up with a 
number other than to evaluate a tax position “based 
on its technical merits” (FIN 48, B27). In its basis 
for conclusions on FIN 48, the FASB writes, “the 
Board does not believe that a legal tax position 
must be obtained to demonstrate that the more-
likely-than-not recognition threshold is met. The 
Board believes that a tax opinion can be external 
evidence supporting a management assertion and 
that management should decide whether to obtain a 
tax opinion after evaluating the weight of all 
available evidence and the uncertainties of the 
applicability of the relevant statutory or case law. 
Other evidence, in addition to or instead of a tax 
opinion, supporting the assertion also could be 
obtained; the level of evidence that is necessary and 
appropriate is a matter of judgment that depends on 
all available information” (FIN 48, B34). 
 In particular, state and local income taxes must 
come under substantially greater scrutiny internally 
as a result of FIN 48’s requirements (Kwiatek). 
Many states and locales utilize a complicated set of 
criteria to determine whether a company has nexus 
in that jurisdiction. Public Law 86-272 holds that 
states are prohibited from “imposing a tax on or 
measured by net income when an entity’s only 
connection with the state is the solicitation of 
orders or sales of tangible personal property.” 
Many states have passed statues or regulations, 
though, that invoke a principle known as 
“economic nexus” whereby businesses can be 
subject to some form of income tax even if not 
physically present in that place. Some states have 
argued that intangible holding companies create an 
economic presence within their borders and attempt 
then to collect income tax from the company. 
Questions that states might ask in order to 
determine whether or not a company has nexus 
range from, “Does the business have an office, 
agency, warehouse or other business location 
owned or leased in the state?” to, “Does the 
business have any employees or representatives 
who use their in-state home to receive business 
callers?” (State Tax Nexus). CPAs with Financial 
Executives International observe: “A business can 
face multiple overlapping tax-collecting 
jurisdictions – countries, states, counties, cities and 
special districts – and tangled rules in the various 
tax authorities based on the type of business, 
location or where the products and services will 
ultimately be used” (Yrjanson, Tuthill 2010). 
FIN 48 requires firms to identify and 
potentially record a liability for taxes owed to a 
state in which it has never before filed a return – 
the statute of limitations never begins to run if a 
return is never filed. The interpretation does allow 
firms to consider widely accepted administrative 
practice where nexus is concerned since several 
states have implemented tax amnesty or voluntary 
disclosure programs in which the “lookback” 
period is reduced if firms initiate contact with the 
jurisdiction to clarify whether they have nexus in 
that jurisdiction (FIN 48 A14-15, Kwiatek). 
Nevertheless, revisiting past years to determine 
whether additional liabilities ought to be recorded 
in accordance with FIN 48 for state and local 
income taxes can present administrative difficulty 
and will require CPAs to continually update their 
understanding of local tax laws or consult lawyers 
or tax professionals with the necessary expertise. 
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 FIN 48 creates additional complications 
related to auditor independence. Accounting firms 
that provide both auditing and tax planning 
advisement services may find their perceived and 
individual independence compromised. It is 
unlikely that a CPA can be properly objective in 
analyzing the sustainability of a tax position that he 
or she advocated for the purpose of filing a tax 
return (Stromsem). Smaller business in particular 
may be forced to retain a tax professional in 
addition to a CPA firm as a result of FIN 48. 
 
Achieving Consistency Using FIN 48 versus 
SFAS No. 5 and SFAS No. 109 
 
 According to the FASB, “Diverse accounting 
practices had developed with respect to the 
recognition and measurement of current and 
deferred tax assets and liabilities in financial 
statements [as of July 2005 when the FASB first 
issued an exposure draft on uncertain tax positions]. 
That diversity resulted from the inconsistency in 
the criteria used to recognize, derecognize, and 
measure the economic benefits associated with tax 
positions” (FIN 48, B2). Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 2, one of the documents 
that guides the FASB in issuing accounting 
pronouncements and interpretations, advises, 
“Information about a particular enterprise gains 
greatly in usefulness if it can be compared with 
similar information about other enterprises … 
Comparability between enterprises and consistency 
in the application of methods over time increases 
the informational value of comparisons of relative 
economic opportunities or performance” (SFAC 2, 
3). The stated primary goal of FIN 48, then, was to 
achieve comparability in accounting for UTPs 
among various enterprises. To this end, FIN 48 is 
successful in that it establishes a consistent 
methodology that had not existed previously. 
From 1992 until the effective date of FIN 48 in 
2006, the prevailing guidance for recording and 
disclosing income tax liability had been SFAS No. 
109, Accounting for Income Taxes. SFAS No. 109 
superseded 1987’s FASB Statement No. 96, itself a 
replacement of Accounting Principles Board 
Opinion No. 11, issued in 1967. SFAS No. 109 
made the significant change of requiring companies 
to record temporary book-tax differences as assets 
and liabilities in the balance sheet rather than as 
deferred charges in the income statement. SFAS 
No. 109 provided no guidance on how firms should 
record UTPs, so most companies deferred to SFAS 
No. 5, a generic statement on contingencies that 
requires firms to accrue material losses that are 
“probable” and “reasonably estimated” and to 
disclose those that are unlikely or not estimable. 
With regard to UTPs, SFAS No. 5 was not always 
useful to financial statement users because firms 
enjoyed considerable flexibility when deciding 
when and how to disclose and accrue tax liabilities 
contingent upon possible audit (Gleason and Mills, 
318). Investors typically have no access to IRS 
audit information or progress, so under the SFAS 
No. 5 approach of accounting for UTPs they were 
afforded no meaningful information related to the 
magnitude of any taxpayer-IRS disputes or the 
likelihood of favorable or unfavorable resolution of 
those disputes. Disagreements between taxpayers 
and the IRS can be ongoing until the completion of 
the audit and related settlements, often months or 
years after the end of the tax year in question. 
Gleason and Mills found through interviews 
that the “primary consideration” in deciding 
whether or not to disclose an expected loss related 
to a tax position pre-FIN 48 was the size of the 
anticipated loss after settlement. Other qualities of 
an expected loss that led to disclosure were 
extremely large IRS claims, public awareness of a 
claim through the press and industry factors. A 
popular benchmark for materiality among large, 
frequently audited taxpaying firms was five percent 
of “normal income,” the greater of actual income or 
five percent of assets (Gleason and Mills 319). The 
study concluded that though firms tended to 
disclose the largest contingent tax liabilities 
voluntarily, they often under-disclosed claims that 
users and regulators would reasonably consider to 
be material. It is worth noting that Gleason and 
Mills ignored for the purposes of their study all 
unaudited returns in part “because firms may 
consider claims on unaudited returns to be too 
remote to require disclosure,” a supposition that 
FIN 48 markedly affected. 
Another major accounting problem that FIN 
48 attempted to rectify was the use of so-called “tax 
cushions” to manipulate earnings. “Prior to the 
issuance of this Interpretation,” the FASB wrote, 
“tax positions were sometimes recognized in the 
financial statements on an as-filed or to-be-filed tax 
basis, such that current or deferred tax assets and 
liabilities were immediately recognized when the 
related tax position was taken (or expected to be 
taken). In some cases, the ultimate realizability of 
any current or deferred tax benefit was evaluated 
and a valuation allowance was recorded” (FIN 48 
B4). The term “tax cushion” ordinarily refers to the 
difference between U.S. current income tax 
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expense reported in the financial statements and 
total taxes due as reported on the corresponding 
income tax return (Gleason and Mills 323). 
Essentially, “tax cushions” allowed a company 
to record for financial purposes a tax liability of, 
say, $100 while only claiming $60 of liability on 
the corresponding tax return, ignoring temporary 
differences, on the basis that the IRS might in the 
future disagree with the company’s treatment of a 
position and require payment of $100 instead of 
$60. The $60 would be expensed in the same fiscal 
year as the tax return was filed – again, 
disregarding any temporary differences for 
simplicity – and the $40 would remain on the books 
as a financial liability. The firm could then in a 
later year release the $40 presuming that the 
position would be successful and record income of 
$40 for that subsequent year. The tax cushion fell 
into the category of what Arthur Levitt termed 
“cookie jar reserves” in describing prominent 
methods of earnings management through 
accounting techniques (Levitt 1998). Corporate 
income tax returns are not publicly accessible, and 
so investors had no way of determining the extent 
to which the release of tax reserves was affecting 
earnings. Research suggests that some firms that 
might otherwise miss earning targets manage tax 
expense in order to meet or exceed expectations 
(Dhaliwal, et. al. 2004 445). 
 
Asset/Liability Approach to Deferred Taxes 
 
 The prevailing guidance for recording the 
income tax effects of an event is Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, issued in 
February 1992. Under SFAS No. 109, tax 
consequences of events where no temporary 
difference occurs are recorded as tax expense – or a 
current tax asset if a refund is expected – in the 
same period as the taxable event. When the tax 
basis of an asset or liability becomes different from 
its reported amount in the financial statements 
because of a temporary difference, a deferred tax 
asset or liability is recorded in the balance sheet. “A 
deferred tax liability or asset represents the increase 
or decrease in taxes payable or refundable in future 
years as a result of temporary differences and 
carryforwards at the end of the current year” (SFAS 
109, Summary). 
 The predecessor to SFAS No. 109, Accounting 
Principles Bulletin 11, required companies to 
record deferred charges in the income statement 
instead of in the balance sheet. The “deferred tax” 
account that appeared in the income statement 
under APB 11 was the product of a relatively 
simple calculation representing the difference 
between the tax effects of all of the transactions 
undertaken in a given year and the tax owed on the 
corresponding tax return. No assets or liabilities 
were recognized, and some users treated the 
deferred entries as mere bookkeeping entries since 
no amounts were listed as being receivable or 
payable. APB 11 included no requirement to 
establish a valuation allowance for uncertain tax 
positions, and the effects of temporary differences 
were accounted for at the tax rate in effect at the 
time of the difference, even if the rates were 
expected to be different at the time of reversal. A 
scenario in which subscription to APB 11 would 
have yielded a different tax expense than 
subscription to SFAS 109 is illustrated in Appendix 
C. 
Though SFAS No. 109 does require 
companies to record a valuation allowance, the 
allowance is created to capture not the 
sustainability of tax positions upon audit but the 
potential for deferred tax assets or liabilities to be 
unrealizable based on future circumstances. For 
example, a deferred tax asset related to a carry-
forward loss might warrant a valuation allowance if 
the ability of the company to generate taxable 
income to be offset by the loss carried forward is 
not definite. 
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
defines assets as “probable future economic 
benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity 
as a result of past transactions or events” (SFAC 6, 
25). The first characteristic of an asset, per 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6, 
is that it “embodies a probable future benefit that 
involves a capacity, singly or in combination with 
other assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to 
future net cash inflows” (SFAC 6, 26). Using this 
definition, FIN 48 properly holds that a claimed tax 
benefit should not be recognized in a company’s 
financial statements if it is not probable that the 
benefit will be realized. Instead, a liability should 
be accrued representing the probable taxes payable 
in the future as well as any associated penalties and 
interest. 
 If the accounting treatment of the tax 
consequence of an event is to fairly reflect the 
underlying reality, though, the analysis prescribed 
by FIN 48 is improper as it tests not the holistic 
probability that a tax position will be sustained but 
rather the theoretical probability that a tax position 
would be sustained provided regulatory agencies 
had the same information as the taxpayer. In its 
11
Muller: Government-Taxpayer Tensions in the Wake of FIN 48 and Schedule U
Published by KnightScholar, 2012
 109
conclusions supporting FIN 48, the Board writes, 
“at this time, it is preferable to separately evaluate 
tax positions for recognition against a recognition 
threshold and to provide separate measurement 
guidance for positions that qualify for recognition” 
versus using an expected-outcome measurement 
(B26). Disregarding the effects of disclosure on the 
decisions of regulators, FIN 48 requires firms to 
record liabilities that are not actually expected. 
 “Implementation of the Proposed 
Interpretation will have the effect of consistently 
overstating the tax accruals for uncertain tax 
positions in direct conflict with the conceptual 
framework of the Board,” wrote one chief tax 
officer of a major company in a comment letter to 
the FASB (Stecker 2005, 4). While it is certainly 
possible that FIN 48 could indeed result in an 
overstatement of liabilities related to UTPs, such is 
not a necessary outcome (Mills, et. al. 2009, 26). 
For example, if a firm determines that the 
possibility of audit is 100 percent and that the 
likelihood that an all-or-nothing claimed tax benefit 
will be sustained is 60 percent, the firm will record 
a FIN 48 liability of zero even though there is a 40 
percent chance that the full amount of the claimed 
benefit will be remitted to a collecting agency in 
the future. In such a scenario, FIN 48 actually 
understates the theoretical liability. When the 
probability of audit is greater than zero, a FIN 48 
analysis may understate, overstate or correctly state 
the tax liability depending on the difference 
between the recognized and claimed benefit, the 
probability of audit and the probability that the 
recognized and unrecognized portions of the 
claimed tax position will be sustained on audit. 
 Though FIN 48 does require firms to disclose 
information that may assist the IRS in gauging the 
extent to which the firm has claimed tax benefits 
that are not likely to be sustained upon audit, the 
FIN 48 liability in aggregated form is not especially 
informative to any one government (Mills, et. al. 
2009 27). While FIN 48 requires firms to test each 
tax position individually, they are not required to 
actually disclose reserves associated with any 
position and so the FIN 48 requirements alone 
could perhaps signal a government audit but 
probably would not spur the inspection of specific 
positions. 
 Where certain large transactions are 
concerned, it is possible that a reported FIN 48 
liability could represent the effect of one large 
event. For example, companies sometimes engage 
in what is known as a “tax-free spin-off” when they 
divest a portion of their business by establishing a 
brand new company with new management. 
Because the business is not sold, the parent 
company does not realize a taxable capital gain on 
the sale. If the tax-free status of such a transaction 
is questionable, the potential capital gain might 
wholly or largely comprise a FIN 48 liability for 
the parent company and in such a situation FIN 48 
could by itself serve as a “roadmap” for the IRS. It 
is likely, though, that an IRS might be triggered 
regardless of FIN 48 simply because the major 
transaction took place at all. Additionally, FIN 48 
disclosure requirements do not require a breakdown 
of the taxes owed to various local, state, national 
and international regulatory bodies. 
 Where FIN 48 draws the line in terms of 
disclosure requirements, however, Schedule UTP 
continues. Because Schedule UTP does require 
taxpayers to identify and describe each UTP 
individually, it is possible that its existence 
increases detection risk substantially. If this is true, 
the technical merits of a position as well as 
administrative practice will indeed be the only 
factors governing whether or not a claimed but 
uncertain tax benefit is realized and FIN 48 will be 
effective in depicting the actual tax benefits and 
liabilities likely to be ultimately realized. The 
extent to which the IRS pursues various UTPs 
using the information provided by taxpayers of 
various size – for tax year 2010, only firms with 
assets of $100 million or greater will complete the 
form – is not yet clear. It is important to note that in 
the final version of Schedule UTP, the IRS will not 
be provided with a dollar amount of the potential 
reversal, but will be alerted to UTPs that represent 
an amount greater than 10 percent of the entire sum 
of reported UTPs. The IRS, then, will not have the 
fullest set of data necessary to perform an exact 
cost-benefit analysis and operate most efficiently. 
 
Usefulness of Tax Disclosures to Financial 
Statement Users 
 
 At this time, it is generally impossible for a 
third-party user of a set of GAAP financial 
statements to discern with confidence the cash 
amount of taxes paid by a corporation to a given 
government for a given tax year (McGill, Outslay 
2002 1131, 1136). Though the total amount of cash 
payments attributable to owed taxes is identified in 
the statement of cash flows, that number represents 
tax payments to multiple jurisdictions related to 
multiple years. U.S. tax returns are not made 
available to the public, so users of financial 
statements are forced to try to deduce an estimate 
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of taxes paid for a certain tax year using the cash 
outflow for income taxes number in the statement 
of cash flows in conjunction with reported income 
tax expense and any related footnotes. Because 
neither amount will necessarily approximate the 
cash amount of taxes paid to the IRS or any other 
regulatory agency, the public may jump to incorrect 
conclusions. In a Nov. 30, 2010 speech on the floor 
of the United States Senate, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-
Vt.) said, “Last year, ExxonMobil made $19 billion 
in profit. Guess what. They paid zero in taxes. They 
got a $156 million refund from the IRS.” The 
company’s 2009 10-K does indeed show that the 
U.S. portion of income tax expense for fiscal year 
2009 was negative $156 million, but this number 
represents the finalization of tax bills from previous 
years as well as current and deferred tax expense 
for 2009. Forbes reported that according to an 
Exxon spokesperson, the company will owe a 
“substantial 2009 tax liability” once the final tax 
bill is figured but declined to offer a number 
(Helman 2010). It is also worth noting that 
ExxonMobil booked $15,165 million of non-U.S. 
income tax for 2009. It is not uncommon for large, 
international companies to siphon taxable income 
to countries with lower tax rates through the use of 
transfer pricing and complex business structures. 
Search engine giant Google, for example, paid an 
overseas tax rate of just 2.4 percent in 2009; its 
transfer pricing arrangements were approved by the 
IRS in 2006 (Drucker 2010). 
 
Confidentiality of Corporate Tax Returns 
 
 Since 1894 (Bernasek 2010), the federal 
government has been prohibited from disclosing 
any portion of an individual or corporate tax return 
with limited and carefully defined exceptions. Until 
1976, income tax returns were classified as public 
records; though not readily accessible to the public, 
they were permitted to be inspected by certain 
government agencies and parties with a material 
interest in the return subject to Treasury regulations 
and the president’s executive order (Lenter, et. al. 
2003 813). The Tax Reform Act of 1976, a 
response to allegations that the Nixon 
administration had improperly used tax return 
information against its political opponents, 
eliminated executive branch control over tax return 
disclosure and reclassified tax returns to 
confidential status (Lenter, et. al. 2003 813). Today, 
there are few circumstances under which the IRS 
may release information from a tax return without 
the express consent of the taxpayer. The major 
circumstances are: when a state tax official or state 
or local law enforcement agency requires such 
information “for the administration of State tax 
laws for the purpose of, and only to the extent 
necessary in, the administration of such laws” (U.S. 
Code §6103 d-1), when a shareholder owning more 
than one percent of a corporation requests the 
information (6103 e-1-D-iii), when information is 
requested by the chair of a Congressional 
committee or the President or an appointee thereof 
(6103 f,g), when certain federal officers or 
employees require information for tax 
administration (6103 h) and when the information 
is to be used in a criminal or national security 
investigation at the federal level (6103 i). Under 
none of these circumstances is the designated 
recipient of the information permitted to share it; 
i.e. a shareholder of a corporation may not obtain 
the corporation’s tax return legally and then publish 
it or disseminate information to a third party. 
 Current law does not allow for prospective 
investors, less-than-one-percent investors or 
creditors to access a corporation’s tax return under 
normal circumstances. In 2003, Rep. Lloyd Doggett 
(D-TX) introduced in the House of Representatives 
a bill titled, Corporate Accountability Tax Gap of 
2003 which would “…permit inspection of true 
corporate tax liability and understand the tax 
strategies undertaken by corporations, to discourage 
abusive tax sheltering activities, and to restore 
investor confidence in publicly traded 
corporations” (U.S. Congress 2003). The Act 
would have made public certain information 
including net corporate income tax, taxable income 
and certain book-tax differences but it has not yet 
been brought to a vote. 
 Some believe that public dissemination of tax 
returns would be a good idea on the basis that 
“sunlight is the best disinfectant” or that 
publicizing tax returns would increase the political 
pressure for tax reform. Others believe that 
providing information to investors that extends 
beyond the requirements of GAAP would improve 
the functionality of financial markets (Lenter, et. al. 
2003 814). Because the IRS is the government 
agency responsible for enforcing tax law and it 
obviously has access to return data, it is not likely 
that making tax returns public would improve the 
ability of the government to enforce laws; §6103 of 
the U.S. Code already allows for federal agencies to 
obtain relevant data from a tax return where 
appropriate. While it is possible that financial 
experts might be able to obtain information 
regarding income tax expense calculations beyond 
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what GAAP provides, FIN 48 has already reduced 
the ability of corporations to manage earnings 
through valuation allowances to the extent that 
viewing the tax return would not enhance markedly 
the quality of information required by GAAP. 
 An interesting argument for making at least a 
portion of corporate tax returns public is that to do 
so would encourage tax compliance because 
corporate managers would be wary to practice 
aggressive tax avoidance with the understanding 
that stakeholders might frown upon such behavior 
as evidence of bad corporate citizenship. While 
there is evidence that both customers and 
stockholders consider a social responsibility and 
corporate citizenship in decisions to purchase from 
or invest in a company, the evidence does not 
suggest that the financial performance of 
corporations is materially affected by these 
perceptions or that the dutiful payment of taxes is 
of particular importance to these stakeholders 
(Lenter, et. al. 2003 820). The argument is also 
weakened by the consideration that public 
disclosure of tax returns might actually incite 
companies to decrease their tax bills for fear of 
being compared by investors to competitors with 
smaller tax bills. 
 The most sustainable argument for publicizing 
corporate tax returns, then, is that doing so might 
encourage political and public pressure for fairness 
in the tax system by exposing inequities among 
companies or industries or discrepancies between 
the goals and outcomes of particular tax laws. 
While such would likely have positive outcomes, 
the downsides of making tax returns public need to 
be considered as well. 
 Both the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Treasury Department responded negatively 
to the 2002 inquiry of Sen. Charles Grassley (R-
Iowa), a letter suggesting that regulators and the 
public might benefit from making corporate tax 
returns public (Lenter, et. al. 2003 804). Lenter, et. 
al. suggests the following as primary reasons to 
retain confidentiality of corporate tax returns: 
corporations might withhold important but sensitive 
information in reporting their tax liability if that 
information were to be publicly available, financing 
and operating strategies of corporations would be 
openly revealed to competitors and some 
corporations might choose to become private or 
even relocate to a foreign country in order to avoid 
disclosing such information. The issue, then, is 
whether the privacy of corporations ought to be 
trumped by the federal government’s interest in 
establishing a fair tax system and collecting an 
appropriate level of revenue in accordance with the 




 By its nature, the relationship between 
taxpayers and their government – a government 
comprised of and controlled by taxpayers - is 
complicated because while it is in the interest of 
taxpayers in the aggregate for the government to 
collect enough revenue to provide the services they 
have, in theory, demanded of it, each individual 
taxpayer is inclined to pay as little as possible. The 
task of the IRS, then, is to perform audits at a rate 
that deters tax evasion, encourages maximum 
compliance and minimizes the cost of 
administration. 
 In fiscal year 2008, the most recent year for 
which comprehensive data is available, the IRS 
employed 20,722 enforcement officers and 
collected a total of $56.4 billion through automatic 
underreporting techniques – for example, 
comparing W-2 and 1099 forms submitted from 
banks, investment firms and employers with the 
information supplied by taxpayers – and traditional 
examination techniques. 1.01% of individual 
returns were audited, with an emphasis on higher-
income taxpayers; 5.57% of tax returns reporting an 
income of $1 million or higher were examined, 
compared to 0.95% of returns reporting an income 
of less than $200,000. The audit rate is low for 
smaller corporations – only 0.95% of corporations 
listing less than $10 million in assets were audited 
in FY 2008, but 15.3% of corporations listing assets 
greater than $10 million were examined; the rate 
rises to 27.4% for corporations listing assets of over 
$250 million (Fiscal). 
 After being notified of the results of an 
examination, corporate and individual taxpayers 
have an opportunity to substantiate their claims; the 
IRS may accept the tax return as filed, propose a 
settlement with the taxpayer or disallow certain tax 
treatments. The taxpayer is then afforded the 
opportunity to contact the Appeals office of the IRS 
or dispute the IRS’s decision with a formal trial in a 
court of law. 
 FIN 48 and Schedule UTP stand to affect 
nearly every step of the audit process. While the 
specifics of the IRS audit selection methods are 
purposefully not made public so as to not tip off 
potential tax evaders on what constitutes a red flag, 
the IRS has been straightforward in its message that 
agents will indeed use Schedule UTP to help guide 
decisions regarding which corporations to audit and 
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which tax positions in particular to examine in that 
audit. In April 2010, IRS Commissioner Doug 
Shulman said that taxpayers and tax authorities 
both desire a balanced tax administration system 
that provides “an efficient use of government and 
taxpayer resources by focusing on the issues and 
taxpayers that pose the greatest risk of tax 
noncompliance” (Shulman 2010). In that same 
address, Shulman stated, “An important thing for 
you to realize is that a major goal of this proposal 
[an early draft of Schedule UTP that required 
taxpayers to list a maximum tax adjustment – that 
requirement was removed from the final 
instructions] is to use the schedule for audit 
selection, not just as information in audits.” 
 Taxpayers are also concerned that Schedule 
UTP implicitly provides the IRS with privileged 
information. In preparing their financial statements 
in accordance with GAAP, corporations must 
frequently consult the expertise and counsel of a tax 
attorney, an accounting firm, or both so that it can 
support the MLTN status of claimed tax benefits 
recorded in the financial statements to its financial 
statement auditor. Schedule UTP requires taxpayers 
to identify not only benefits that fail the MLTN test 
on their technical merits but also benefits that 
would fail the MLTN were it not for the firm’s 
intent to litigate an adversarial opinion of the IRS. 
In a very real sense, then, a corporation is required 
to unveil to the IRS the opinions of its legal counsel 
– that is, the opinion that a position is not MLTN to 
succeed on technical merit even if it can, perhaps, 
succeed on legal merit – before any sort of trial 
begins. As one scholar articulates, “Ambiguity in 
the tax law is resolved by litigation – a system of 
adversaries. For effective common law to develop, 
courts must hear ‘zealous advocacy’ from both 
sides in every case. Tax law is no exception.” 
(Jones 799). 
 Empirical research finds that many companies 
released a material amount of tax reserves shortly 
prior to the effective date of FIN 48 (Blouin, et. al. 
2006, 808). The research supports the notion that 
many companies desire to minimize their FIN 48 
liability. A desire to reduce the kind of IRS scrutiny 
that might weaken a corporation’s negotiating 
positions is a probable contributing factor to this 
phenomenon; the authors also consider a desire of 
companies to record the release of any lingering 
excessive tax reserves as an increase in income 
statement earnings versus as a cumulative change 
in accounting principle adjustment to retained 
earnings that would have no effect on current-year 
income. 
 It should be noted that FIN 48 and Schedule 
UTP do not necessarily yield a disadvantage for 
every corporate taxpayer in every circumstance. On 
the contrary, the enhanced disclosure requirements 
for the first time allow a taxpayer to credibly 
indicate to the IRS that all or most of the positions 
taken in the tax return are MLTN to be sustained. 
“FIN 48 re-enforced my belief that taking risky tax 
positions is not in a company’s best interest,” wrote 
one tax professional wishing to remain anonymous. 
“I realize there are grey areas and differences of 
opinion can exist, but I’ve never lost an issue I’ve 
researched and built a solid supporting position for 
… My comfort level for taking a position is closer 
to a ‘should’ position and thus a FIN 48 reserve 
would be zero.” The 2009 paper by Mills, et. al. 
finds that “taxpayers with strong positions have 
higher expected payoffs post-FIN 48 than they did 
pre-FIN 48” (29) because the government has less 
incentive to audit a company showing little or no 
uncertainty under FIN 48 compared to a company 
that provides no credible disclosure of position 
sustainability at all, and certainty compared to a 
company showing a high level of uncertainty. 
 
Observed Attitudes of the IRS 
 
 In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
IRS may obtain tax accrual workpapers under 26 
U.S.C. §7602, which authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to summon and “examine any books, 
papers, records, or other data which may be 
relevant or material” to a particular tax inquiry 
(United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 813). The 
Court found that, “It is the responsibility of the IRS 
to determine whether the corporate taxpayer, in 
completing its return, has stretched a particular tax 
concept beyond what is allowed. Records that 
illuminate any aspect of the return – such as the tax 
accrual workpapers at issue in this case – are 
therefore highly relevant to legitimate IRS inquiry” 
(815). In that same case, the Court considered 
whether some sort of accountant-client privilege 
ought to be enacted, but found that because 
independent auditors, unlike lawyers, ultimately 
bear responsibility to the public over the client, “To 
insulate from disclosure a certified public 
accountant’s interpretation of the client’s financial 
statements would be to ignore the significance of 
the accountant’s role as a disinterested analyst 
charged with public obligations” (818). 
 Since the Supreme Court ruling, the IRS has 
affirmed a policy of restraint with regard to tax 
accrual workpapers. “Audit or tax accrual 
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workpapers should normally be sought only when 
such factual data cannot be obtained from the 
taxpayer’s records or from available third parties, 
and then only as a collateral source for factual 
data,” the IRS writes in its Internal Revenue 
Manual (4.10.20.3.1).  “Audit or tax accrual 
workpapers should be requested with discretion and 
not as a matter of standard examining procedure.” 
This policy was first asserted in 1984, but was 
adjusted in 2002 to exclude “listed transactions” 
from restraint as a response to the growing 
preponderance of high-profile corporate tax 
shelters. After FIN 48 became effective in 
December 2006, there was much concern within the 
accounting profession that the IRS would be 
tempted to utilize FIN 48 workpapers and renege 
on its self-imposed policy of restraint. In May 
2007, the IRS published a “FIN 48 Implications 
LB&I Field Examiners’ Guide” which noted: “The 
disclosures required under FIN 48 should give the 
Service a somewhat better view of a taxpayer’s 
uncertain tax positions; however, the disclosures 
still do not have the specificity that would allow a 
perfect view of the issues and amounts at risk.” The 
guide continues, “Even with the lack of specificity, 
tax footnotes included in financial statements, 
including FIN 48 disclosures, should be carefully 
reviewed and analyzed as part of the audit planning 
process … Revenue Agents should not be reluctant 
to pursue matters mentioned in FIN 48 disclosures, 
but should be mindful of our policy of restraint on 
Tax Accrual Workpapers and not cross over the 
boundaries contained there.” The guide also notes 
that some taxpayers desire expedient resolution of 
uncertain tax issues since a large FIN 48 liability 
can have a negative impact on the financial 
statements. 
 In 2009, the issue of work product privilege 
was applied to FIN 48 in USA v. Textron. Textron 
is a publicly traded company audited by Ernst & 
Young; in 2003, the IRS audited Textron’s 2001 
tax return and issued an administrative summons to 
obtain tax accrual work papers under §7602 
because it was suspected by the IRS that Textron 
had engaged in sale-in, lease-out transactions as 
well as other “listed transactions.” The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that Textron’s 
work papers are not protected under the work 
product privilege because tax accrual work papers 
are prepared primarily for the sake of calculating 
items to be included in financial statements and not 
in anticipation of a court trial (24). The Supreme 
Court decided not to review the appeal, letting the 
ruling of the appeals court stand. 
 The 2009 Textron case differs from the 1984 
Arthur Young case in that Textron’s work papers 
were produced by Textron’s tax department with 
consultation from outside legal counsel; in the 
Arthur Young case, the work papers were prepared 
by the auditor and so the issue of work product 
privilege was never considered. The driving 
contention in the Textron case is not the relevance 
of the tax accrual work papers to the IRS audit but 
whether or not the work papers can be considered 
documentation that is prepared because of the 
prospect of litigation. Essentially, the First Circuit 
court’s ruling holds that the work required to 
document a FIN 48 analysis for the sake of proving 
proper financial statement to auditors can be 
requested and summoned by the IRS in order to 
determine whether or not a tax benefit holds merit. 
Because managers of publicly traded companies 
need to support the assertions contained in financial 
statements in order to obtain an unqualified opinion 
from an auditor, they are left no choice but to 
prepare documentation of uncertain tax positions 
that incorporates the opinions of legal counsel 
knowing that such documentation could ultimately 
be used against them by the IRS. 
 In response to these concerns, the IRS in 
October 2010 issued Announcement 2010-76, 
which expanded the Service’s existing policy of 
restraint; the announcement affirms the ability of 
agents to request documentation of legal support 
for positions, but permits taxpayers to withhold a 
document if it “is otherwise privileged under the 
attorney-client privilege, the tax advice privilege in 
§7525 of the Code, or the work product doctrine 
and the document was provided to an independent 
auditor as part of an audit of the taxpayer’s 
financial statements.” That policy became effective 
Sept. 24, 2010. Once again, the policy of restraint 
does not apply if unusual circumstances exist or if 
the taxpayer has claimed the benefits of one or 
more “listed transactions.” The IRS also permits 
taxpayers to redact information from requested tax 
reconciliation work papers if that information 
contains specific calculations and reserve amounts 
related to Schedule UTP. 
 On March 23, 2011, the IRS issued a 
“Frequently Asked Questions on Schedule UTP” on 
its website; the document clarified that the policy of 
restraint outlined in Announcement 2010-76 
applies to documents requested by Appeals as well 
as documents requested by Counsel after a Tax 
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Initial Schedule UTP Proposal and Feedback 
  
On April 19, 2010, the IRS released a draft of 
Schedule UTP that would have, if fully enacted 
without revisions, required corporations listing 
assets of $10 million or greater to disclose UTPs to 
the IRS beginning in tax year 2010. The initial draft 
required filers to complete the same analysis as is 
required in the final version, but also required 
corporations to calculate and report a Maximum 
Tax Adjustment for each UTP – the maximum 
amount in dollars that might be retained by the IRS 
should the IRS prevail in challenging the position. 
 After an open comment period, the IRS made 
adjustments to the draft that eliminated the 
Maximum Tax Adjustment requirement, allowed 
corporations to exclude UTPs that were not 
reserved under FIN 48 because of administrative 
practice and scaled back the filing requirements so 
that only those companies listing $100 million or 
greater in assets would be subject to the 
requirements immediately. Corporations listing $50 
million in assets will fall under the requirements 
beginning in tax year 2012, and corporations listing 
$10 million will begin filing Schedule UTP in tax 
year 2014. A final major adjustment in the final 
draft is the elimination of the requirement for 
corporations to report to the IRS the rationale for 
taking an uncertain position. Critics had argued that 
such a requirement would force corporations to 
reveal privileged information to the IRS. The final 
version requires corporations to explain the nature 
of the uncertainty for each UTP but does not ask 
them to justify their decision to take the position. 
 The upsides of Schedule UTP from a public 
perspective are not trivial. The schedule will allow 
the IRS to audit more efficiently by concentrating 
its resources on resolving those issues that are most 
likely to exploit inconsistencies and ambiguities in 
the tax code. The manager of accounting policy and 
financial research for FEI writes that a review of 
reported UTPs will allow the IRS Large Business & 
International Division to potentially undergo the 
process of “publishing guidance necessary to 
eliminate uncertainty wherever possible, as well as 
identifying areas for possible legislative changes” 
(Wei 2010). Both of these proposed uses of 
Schedule UTP would be legitimate and welcome. 
There is concern, though, that another use of the 
schedule involves the executive branch equivalent 
of judicial activism – proactively challenging tax 
positions in court or in negotiation in such a way as 
to maximize present and future collections instead 
of striving for consistent, objective interpretation of 
the law. 
 
Interactions Between Schedule UTP and Restraint 
Policy 
  
IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman stated to the 
American Bar Association that the IRS will not 
seek documents that would otherwise be privileged, 
nor will it procure drafts of issue descriptions or 
information regarding the ranking of issues used in 
preparation of Schedule UTP (Shulman 2010). The 
stated goal of the IRS is to create certainty for the 
government and taxpayers alike sooner and to 
operate efficiently and effectively. In a September 
directive, the Deputy Commissioner for Services 
and Enforcement of the IRS instructed personnel to 
“approach UTPs on audit keeping in mind their 
responsibility to apply the law as it currently exist, 
not how we would like it to be. We must do this 
without bias in favor of the government or the 
taxpayer” (Miller 2010). Though these words 
soothe the fear that the government will use 
Schedule UTP to exploit ambiguities in tax law, the 
structural system created by the policy relies 
heavily on a fallible promise. Once a corporation 
has acknowledged that a tax position is uncertain, 
the IRS has full reign to use that information to 
sway a court. 
 The LB&I Subgroup of the IRS Advisory 
Council reported in November 2010 that it 
disagrees with the issuance of Schedule UTP and 
finds “significant challenges to overcome to make 
sure that examination teams utilize the information 
contained on this schedule in a reasonable manner” 
(IRS Advisory Council). There is also legitimate 
concern about the consequences of Schedule UTP 
contents being released to foreign governments. 
The release of tax information between countries 
can trigger heavy scrutiny of transfer pricing 
arrangements that affect the taxability of income in 
various international jurisdictions, and jurisdictions 
outside of the U.S. might use the information 
aggressively to the disadvantage of corporations. 
The IRS has responded to this concern by noting 
that only under very limited conditions would 
release of Schedule UTP data to other jurisdictions 
be considered. 
 
Role of Auditors in Government-Taxpayer 
Relationship 
 
 The largest U.S. corporations almost 
exclusively employ four global accounting firms: 
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Deloitte & Touch, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. These firms have 
collectively become known as the “Big Four” 
because they collectively provide advisory, tax and 
auditing services to a vast majority of publicly 
traded and large private companies. The SEC does 
not require listed companies to choose these firms 
as auditors, but the Big Four have established 
globalized capabilities and competencies that 
regional firms cannot match. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 forbids any accounting firm from 
simultaneously auditing and providing certain non-
assurance to publicly-traded corporations. Many 
publicly-traded corporations therefore utilize two 
Big Four firms at once, each providing a different 
set of services. Considering that two international 
companies engaged in a merger or acquisition will 
likely each wish to retain one accounting firm to 
perform auditing services and one to perform due 
diligence services, a minimum of four global 
accounting firms must exist to provide support 
services to the two companies as they join together. 
 Accounting firms play a major role in 
determining the extent to which the IRS can 
successfully identify UTPs by certifying that the 
company’s FIN 48 analysis has been sound. From 
an advisement perspective, accounting firms 
providing tax services can sell tax shelter packages 
or instruct tax avoidance strategies and provide 
legal and technical support for uncertain positions 
that can be used to justify categorizing a tax 
position as MLTN to be sustained upon audit. From 
an auditing stance, the firms bear the responsibility 
of certifying that a company’s financial statements 
comply with GAAP and, by extension, ASC 740. 
Because the MLTN test involves a subjective 
judgment of the empirical justifiability of a tax 
position, the opinions of the tax advisor and auditor 
directly dictate whether or not a company will be 
required to report a given tax position to the IRS on 
Schedule UTP and subject that position to special 
scrutiny. The value of Schedule UTP, then, depends 
completely on how accounting firms interpret and 
enforce ASC 740 and the MLTN test specifically. 
 Because the Big Four exercise what amounts 
to an oligopoly over providing accounting and 
auditing services to the largest U.S. corporations, 
government agencies have a limited ability to 
sanction firms that violate policies. The 2003 
KPMG tax shelter investigation illustrates this 
perfectly. Though the Senate found that KPMG had 
indeed knowingly sold tax shelters to clients, the 
government agreed to dismiss criminal prosecution 
of the firm so long as it paid $456 million in fines, 
restitution and penalties and complied with other 
conditions including the termination of two tax 
practice areas (IRS Notice 2005-83). Following the 
2002 collapse of Arthur Andersen, the risk of 
another global accounting firm shuttering its doors 
posed too great a risk to the economy and so the 
government instead held KPMG to an impossible 
ultimatum. The Department of Justice’s charges 
against 13 individual KPMG employees were later 
thrown out after a judge ruled that the U.S. 
improperly pressured KPMG to not pay the legal 
fees of its former employees. The case illustrates 
the tension between the desire of the government to 
influence the practices of accounting firms and the 
competing desire to have effective competition 
among large accounting firms. Though accountants 
and the FASB are in theory independent of the 
government and of clients, both are subject to 
political pressures. Accounting policies and 
disclosure requirements can either undermine or aid 
the enforcement techniques of governmental 
agencies and particularly the IRS, as illustrated by 
the Service’s use of FIN 48 requirements to justify 
the issuance of Schedule UTP. Accounting 
practices and standards do not exist in a vacuum; 
they need to be useable and relevant to a system of 
stakeholders with different and sometimes 
conflicting needs. 
 The fact that the collapse of any one of the Big 
Four firms would pose a great risk to the global and 
domestic economy holds foreboding connotations 
for a public that depends on their auditing services. 
Though regulatory agencies like the IRS and SEC 
have the ability to sanction or press charges against 
corporations, they rely heavily on the notion that 
corporate financial statements have undergone 
reasonable verification by a Big Four firm. 
 
Related Topics in Accounting 
 
 Accounting for income taxes is distinguished 
from accounting for most other types of 
transactions because income taxes are calculated 
using non-GAAP conventions. In discussing the 
issues associated with providing information to 
third-party users based on accounting estimates 
when the third-party user’s reaction to and use of 
that information may well affect the extent to which 
the original estimate becomes a certainty, though, it 
is useful to consider the accounting treatment of 
contingent liabilities associated with litigation, the 
environment, and multiemployer plans. 
Additionally, consideration must be given to the 
fact that the U.S. will likely adopt International 
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Financial Reporting Standards to replace GAAP 
within this decade. Should the change come to pass, 
differences in accounting for uncertain income tax 
positions will affect the information collection 




 SFAS No. 5 provides guidelines that are 
intended to apply directly to the accounting for 
pending or threatened litigation. As mentioned 
earlier, the standard requires companies to accrue a 
loss if and only if the incurrence of a liability or 
impairment of an asset is probable and the amount 
of the loss can be reasonably estimated. The 
standard defines probable as: “The future event or 
events are likely to occur” (SFAS 5, 3a). If a loss is 
not accrued but there is a reasonable probability 
that a loss has occurred, disclosure must be made 
indicating the nature of the contingency and the 
range of the loss, if an estimate can be made (10). 
Contingent gains are never recorded in a 
company’s financial statements, though careful 
disclosure must be made in the case that a gain is 
probable or reasonably possible (17a, b). 
 The FASB clarifies in SFAS No. 5 that, “The 
filing of a suit or formal assertion of a claim or 
assessment does not automatically indicate that 
accrual of a loss may be appropriate. The degree of 
an unfavorable outcome must be assessed” (SFAS 
5, 37). The statement appropriately suggests that 
accrual of a contingency should be based on an 
independent, technical analysis of the situation and 
not on the formal actions of an antagonist party. 
Under this thinking, corporations should not write 
off tax benefits that have been taken under the 
belief that they are consistent with prevailing tax 
law simply because the IRS or another regulatory 
agency has challenged the validity of those 
benefits. 
 The current guidelines for recording UTPs 
differs from the guidelines for recording the 
potential effect of future lawsuits in that tax 
benefits must be scrutinized even if management 
does not believe that the benefits will be 
challenged. SFAS No. 5 states: “With respect to 
unasserted claims and assessments, an enterprise 
must determine the degree of probability that a suit 
may be filed or a claim or assessment may be 
asserted and the possibility of an unfavorable 
outcome … If the judgment is that assertion is not 
probable, no accrual or disclosure would be 
required” (38). Corporations need not disclose or 
accrue losses related to litigation that is unlikely to 
ever be threatened because the potential plaintiffs 
are unaware that they have a valid complaint or 
choose not to press charges. Indeed, it would be 
nonsensical for a company to disclose and accrue a 
loss related to a lawsuit that would not even be 
brought were the company not openly admitting to 
having wronged another party. In such a case, the 
accounting framework would actually lead to the 
creation of a liability rather than being the 
mechanism that records it. 
 Where taxes are concerned, though, GAAP is 
requiring companies to do just that – create a 
liability that is nonexistent for practical purposes 
because of a theoretical application of accounting 
standards. Accruing or disclosing losses or 
foregone benefits related to UTPs would be 
appropriate only if the likelihood of those positions 
being audited is 100% independently of the loss 
disclosure. 
 While disclosures related to ongoing litigation 
do have the potential to give an opposing party’s 
counsel insight into whether the company considers 
a loss reasonably possible or even probable, the 
judgment surrounding those disclosures is based on 
circumstances as they exist at the time the financial 
statements are compiled, not as they might exist 
after the statements are released. ASC 740 in 
conjunction with Schedule UTP creates an iterative 
effect whereby the accounting treatment affects the 
event being accounted for – a very troubling side 
effect considering the information provided by 
financial reporting is intended to be historical. The 
FASB writes: “To the extent that financial 
reporting provides information that helps identify 
relatively efficient and inefficient users of 
resources, aids in assessing relative returns and 
risks of investment opportunities, or otherwise 
assists in promoting efficient functioning of capital 
and other markets, it helps to create a favorable 
environment for capital formation decisions. 
However, investors, creditors, and others make 
those decisions, and it is not a function of financial 
reporting to try to determine or influence the 
outcomes of those decisions” (SFAC 1, 33). The 
FASB addresses taxing authorities specifically: 
“Although both taxing authorities and rate-making 
bodies often use the information in financial 
statements for their purposes, both also have 
statutory authority to require the specific 
information they need to fulfill their functions and 
do not need to rely on information provided to 
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Environmental Liabilities and Asset Retirement 
Obligations 
 
 FASB Interpretation No. 47, like FIN 48, was 
issued in response to companies’ adoption of 
diverse accounting practices related to AROs. FIN 
47 clarifies that companies must record the fair 
value of conditional AROs as soon as incurred if 
the fair value can be reasonably estimated. In some 
cases, disclosure provided by the company is 
supplemented with and even dictated by data that is 
publicly available through the Superfund Program. 
Superfund refers to the 1980 Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act that gave the Environmental 
Protection Agency the authority to identify parties 
responsible for the contamination of U.S. sites and 
compel cleanup efforts. 
 An interesting facet of the accounting 
guidelines related to AROs involves the 
characterization of a liability as broader than a 
contractual obligation to sacrifice a resource. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
143 states that its guidelines apply to “legal 
obligations … a legal obligation is an obligation 
that a party is required to settle as a result of an 
existing or enacted law, statute, ordinance, or 
written or oral contract or by legal construction of a 
contract under the doctrine of promissory estoppel” 
(2). SFAS 143 applies promissory estoppel as 
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary: “The principle 
that a promise made without consideration may 
nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the 
promisor should have reasonably expected the 
promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee 
did actually rely on the promise to his or her 
detriment” (SFAS 143, A2c). The implementation 
guidance notes correspondingly that “a legal 
obligation may exist even though no party has 
taken any formal action” and requires entities to 
base their evaluation of whether an obligation 
exists on current laws and not on forecasts of future 
laws or changed interpretations of existing laws 
(SFAS 143, A3). The FASB cites the example of a 
CEO who makes public comments stating that his 
company will clean up an abandoned building in 
future years as potentially constituting a recordable 
liability under promissory estoppel. In its basis for 
conclusions, the FASB writes: “Once an entity 
determines that a duty or responsibility exists, it 
will then need to assess whether an obligating event 
has occurred that leaves it little or no discretion to 
avoid the transfer or use of assets” (SFAS 143, 
B29). 
 Again, while the public would like for all 
companies to voluntarily identify and clean up any 
environmental damage they cause, it would not 
make sense for companies to report to investors and 
creditors financial liabilities that have a remote 
probability of ever materializing. It is possible that 
laws becoming effective in the future will create 
environmental liabilities for certain companies, but 
to record an obligation related to a potential-but-
not-certain legal requirement would not reflect the 
underlying realities in which the company operates 
and SFAS 143 appropriately requires that 
judgments be made in accordance with existing 
interpretations of existing laws. Financial 
statements should reflect the financial and 
economic position of a company as it really is, not 
as it would be under ideal or contrived 
circumstances. Ideally, all customers would satisfy 
debts owed to a company and an allowance for bad 
debts would be unnecessary; in a worst-case 
scenario, all debts would prove uncollectible and 
revenues would be recorded only when cash is 
received. Neither scenario is the most probable, 
though, and the current accounting system strives to 
best represent the actual probability of collecting 
the receivables rather than defer to extreme 
possibilities. Moreover, the probability that 
individual accounts will be collected is typically 
estimated using factors like the creditworthiness of 
the debtor, the size of the debt, the debtor’s 
payment history and the length of time that has 
elapsed since the debt arose. The obligation to 
satisfy the debt has no relation to whether or not the 
company believes the debt is collectible. Similarly, 
the obligation to pay taxes associated with income 
realized in a given transaction or event is unrelated 
to whether or not the company or the IRS believes 
that obligation is real. 
 Of course, the enforcement of tax law by the 
IRS is usually the predicator of tax liabilities, but 
the associated actions would not create a liability 
were there not a legal framework detailing and 
mandating taxation policies in the first place. There 
are two factors that predicate the recording or 
disclosure of a liability where legal or 
environmental liabilities are concerned: that the 
liability arises out of a valid mechanism – an on-
the-books law – through which a third party 
including but not limited to a governmental 
enforcement agency can demand payment from the 
company, and that some third party, known or 
unknown to the entity issuing the statement, will be 
aware of that mechanism and use it to seek 
payment. 
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Participation in Multiemployer Plans 
 
 The FASB is expected to issue a final 
document related to enhancing the disclosure 
requirements about an employer’s participation in a 
multiemployer plans in the second quarter of 2011 
(FASB Current Technical Plan). Existing guidance 
related to accounting for multiemployer plans is 
represented in Codification Subtopic 715-80. The 
FASB writes that it decided to update 715-80 after 
it received “comments from various constituents on 
the perceived lack of transparency about an 
employer’s participation in a multiemployer plan” 
(FASB Exposure Draft). The proposed amendments 
would require employers to provide a narrative 
description of “the employer’s exposure to 
significant risks and uncertainties arising from its 
participation in the plan(s). That narrative 
description shall include the extent to which, under 
the terms and conditions of the plan(s), the 
employer can be liable to the plan(s) for other 
participating employer’s obligations.” Employers 
would also be required to identify “known trends in 
contributions, including the extent to which a 
surplus or deficit in the plan may affect future 
contributions,” and other related pieces of 
information. 
 Critics of the proposed amendment argue that 
it will discourage employers from providing 
defined benefit plans to employees and instead 
offer defined contribution plans because the 
amendment will force companies to disclose 
liabilities that are unlikely to be realized. In 
particular, the amendment would require companies 
to disclose the effects of their potential withdrawal 
from a multiemployer plan even if they have no 
intention of withdrawing. “As stated in the FASB’s 
Guiding Principles, to be neutral, ‘information must 
report economic activity as faithfully as possible 
without coloring the image it communicates for the 
purpose of influencing behavior in any particular 
direction,’” one critic writes (Kraw). “The FASB 
proposals, if adopted, are by their very construct 
biased against the continuation of multiemployer 
defined benefit plans. They inevitably will produce 
large amounts of inaccurate information that 
exaggerate pension plan liabilities, encourage short 
term thinking and push employers to exit.” Other 
letters addressed the fact that information about 
assets and accumulated benefit obligations of 
defined benefit plans is difficult to collect and 
contingent upon decisions made by labor unions 
with little forewarning and thus would be dated and 
allegedly useless if presented in financial 
statements. One critic described the proposed 
disclosures as “inherently capable of 
misinterpretation, at best, and utterly meaningless, 
at worst” (Potts-Dupre). 
 Though the issues and potential impacts of the 
proposed multiemployer plan disclosure 
amendment are different from those associated with 
uncertain tax positions, the debate regarding when, 
if ever, to report prospective liabilities that have a 
remote chance of actually occurring. While it is 
true that companies choosing to withdraw from an 
underfunded pension plan must typically pay large 
withdrawal liability assessments or “exit fees,” it is 
unreasonable to ask companies to report those 
amounts if the chance of ever having to pay those 
amounts is remote. Many businesses are susceptible 
to the impact of natural disasters and war, but a 
quantification of those kinds of risks would be 
misleading to a prospective investor if the 
businesses were otherwise financially secure. 
 
Convergence with International Standards 
 
 The U.S. and the FASB are in discussions with 
the International Accounting Standards Board to 
eventually converge the guidelines of GAAP with 
those of International Financial Reporting 
Standards so that there will exist a set of unified 
global accounting policies. The SEC has indicated 
that the largest U.S. corporations will not be 
required to adopt IFRS until 2015 or 2016 at the 
earliest, if at all (Tweedie), and a final decision on 
whether or not to officially incorporate IFRS into 
the U.S. domestic reporting system may come 
during 2011. 
 If convergence does occur, it may yield an 
entirely new set of standards related to accounting 
for UTPs. Should ASC 740 be altered, Schedule 
UTP would have to be reevaluated. It is currently 
based on the MLTN test, a test that could be 
superseded or altered by new income tax 
accounting requirements. Schedule UTP is now 
justified on the basis that companies do not incur 
significant costs in preparing Schedule UTP 
because they already analyze the sustainability of 
tax positions in order to comply with GAAP. If the 
requirement to analyze the sustainability of all tax 
positions ceases, Schedule UTP compliance would 
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Accounting for UTPs Under IFRS 
  
International Accounting Standard No. 12, 
“Income Taxes,” currently advises that unresolved 
disputes with tax authorities be handled in 
accordance with IAS 37, “Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets” (IAS 12, 88). 
IAS 37 advocates an expected outcome approach 
that uses the probability-weighted average of a 
variety of possible outcomes to calculate the 
amount that should be recorded as a tax benefit or 
liability. The standard requires separate treatment 
of provisions, defined as “liabilit[ies] of uncertain 
timing or amount” and contingent liabilities, 
defined as “a possible obligation that arises from 
past events and whose existence will be confirmed 
only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or 
more uncertain future events not wholly within the 
control of the entity” or a present obligation not 
recognized because resource outflow is improbable 
or the amount of the obligation is uncertain (IAS 
37, 10). UTPs would likely be treated as contingent 
liabilities because the obligation to pay the tax is 
dependent upon the actions of regulatory agencies 
and courts. 
 IAS 37 does not require entities to recognize 
contingent liabilities (27), but does require 
disclosure “unless the possibility of an outflow of 
resources embodying economic benefits is remote” 
(28). Contingent liabilities must be continually 
assessed and recognized as a provision in the 
financial statements “if it becomes probable that an 
outflow of future economic benefits will be 
required for an item previously dealt with as a 
contingent liability” (30). The standard instructs: 
“Where the provision being measured involves a 
large population of items, the obligation is 
estimated by weighting all possible outcomes by 
their associated probabilities … The provision will 
therefore be different depending on whether the 
probability of a loss of a given amount is, for 
example, 60 per cent or 90 per cent. Where there is 
a continuous range of possible outcomes, and each 
point in that range is as likely as any other, the mid-
point of the range is used” (39). Disclosure must 
include a brief description of the nature of the 
obligation and an indication of the uncertainties 
about the amount or timing of outflows (85). The 
standard does not explicitly state the extent to 
which individual liabilities must be separately 
identified, stating, “It is necessary to consider 
whether the nature of the items is sufficiently 
similar for a single statement about them to fulfill 
the requirements” (87). 
 At a July 2005 meeting of the IASB, the Board 
agreed that enterprises should presume that taxing 
authorities will review a tax positions when 
evaluating whether the position is probable of being 
sustained and that consideration of detection risk is 
inappropriate (IASB Agenda Project). An exposure 
draft proposing to replace IAS 12 was issued in 
March 2009. It included the following guidance: 
“Uncertainty about whether the tax authorities will 
accept the amounts reported to them by the entity 
affects the amount of current tax and deferred tax. 
An entity shall measure current and deferred tax 
assets and liabilities using the probability-weighted 
average amount of all the possible outcomes, 
assuming that the tax authorities will examine the 
amounts reported to them and have full knowledge 
of all relevant information. Changes in the 
probability-weighted average amount of all 
possible outcomes shall be based on new 
information, not a new interpretation by the entity 
of previously available information” (Exposure 
Draft 26). 
 In November 2009, the IASB found that 
support from respondents was limited and decided 
that the project would not proceed in its then-
current form (IASB Agenda Project). On its 
website, the IASB writes: “The project originally 
started as a convergence project with US GAAP. 
However, in the light of responses to an exposure 
draft published in 2009, the Board has narrowed the 
scope of the project. The Board may consider a 
fundamental review of the accounting for income 
taxes after 2011” (Work plan for IFRSs). Though 
the Board intends to consider uncertain tax 
positions separately from IAS 12 as a whole, it will 
not visit the issue until the revision of IAS 37 is 
finalized; that project will not be finished until after 
June 2011 according to the work plan website. 
 Another point of distinction to be resolved 
between GAAP and IFRS involves the reporting 
threshold. While ASC 740 disallows companies 
from recording any portion of a tax benefit that is 
less than 50% likely to be sustained, IFRS tends to 
utilize an expected-outcome method. Consider a tax 
benefit of $100 that the company believes has a 
20% chance of being completely sustained, a 40% 
chance of being reduced to $60 and a 40% chance 
of being completely disallowed. The FIN 48 test 
would require that the company record a tax benefit 
of $60, since the probability that the benefit will be 
at least $60 is 60%: 40% plus 20%. An expected-
outcome calculation would yield a tax benefit of 
$48: 0.20*100 + 0.40*60 + 0.40*0. 
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 If there was no chance that the $100 benefit 
would be disallowed entirely but a 40% chance it 
would be reduced to $50, the FIN 48 test would 
still yield a $60 tax benefit but an expected-
outcome approach would yield a recordable benefit 
of $62: 0.20*100 + 0.40*60 + 0.40*50. Though an 
expected-outcome calculation incorporates a wider 
range of possible outcomes, critics argue that it 
requires companies to estimate the probability that 
remote and highly certain positions will be 
sustainable. The Tax Executives Institute 
commented on the IAS 12 exposure draft: “The 
absence of a recognition threshold (as proposed in 
the Exposure Draft) would result in potential 
inaccuracies by requiring companies to recognize 
tax benefits that are highly uncertain or even those 
for which no or only meager authority exists. 
Likewise, reserves would have to be provided for 
highly certain positions if there are possible 
outcomes yielding less than 100 percent of the tax 
benefits. The measurement of tax positions that are 
at the highly certain or highly uncertain ends of the 
probability spectrum should not be skewed by 
outcomes that are remote” (TEI Comments). 
 IAS 12 is silent on UTPs in its existing form, 
so the ultimate IFRS will likely have a significant 
impact on the future of Schedule UTP if the U.S. 





 The FASB defines a liability as a “probable 
future sacrifice of economic benefits arising from a 
present obligation.” The legal requirement to pay 
taxes clearly creates a liability, and stakeholders of 
a company need to be aware of that company’s 
liabilities in order to make an informed decision 
regarding whether or not to enter into a financial 
relationship with the company. What FIN 48 
attempts to address, though, are those situations in 
which it is unclear whether or not the obligation to 
pay taxes exists. U.S. tax law includes a large 
number of provisions governing income and 
expense classification as well as policy-driven 
deductions, credits and penalties that require 
tremendous compliance efforts. When tax laws do 
not neatly correspond to the events and transactions 
undertaken by a given corporation, the managers of 
that business must interpret applicable laws and 
decide whether or not to report taxable income. 
 If corporations report to the IRS and other 
regulatory agencies tax benefits that are likely to be 
challenged and reversed, investors should be made 
aware of those potential liabilities. The problematic 
side effect of reporting such liabilities, though, is 
the possibility that doing so may actually trigger 
scrutiny of the positions that would not have taken 
place absent the financial reporting. The statute of 
limitations for tax reporting far exceeds the time 
period companies are afforded to prepare financial 
statements, and so regulators will always be able to 
refer to a company’s financial statements in 
inspecting that company’s tax return. Though FIN 
48 was originally intended to clarify reporting 
practices related to income taxes and has been 
successful in creating more consistency than 
existed previously, it has also created a tool through 
which regulators can garner a peek into the 
perspective of the taxpayer – an advantage not 
reciprocated. The requirements of FIN 48 make it 
far more difficult for tax-aggressive companies to 
underreport tax liability, but at the cost of 
potentially influencing, for better or worse, the 
economic realities that GAAP purports to reflect. 
 While the disclosures required by FIN 48 are 
theoretically flawed because detection risk is 
ignored, an aggregated presentation of potential tax 
liability is not egregiously harmful. Though some 
distortion occurs in estimating tax position 
sustainability without regard to audit probability, 
the distortion is likely less significant than that 
created by the misuse of reserves and reporting 
policy discrepancies that were permissible under 
SFAS 109. 
 Of greater concern from a policy standpoint is 
the IRS’s new Schedule UTP. Though the schedule 
will undoubtedly improve the U.S. government’s 
ability to target its audits toward likely tax evaders 
and thereby increase corporate collections, it holds 
the capacity to alter the dynamics of the taxpayer-
government relationship significantly. Even if the 
IRS upholds its policy of restraint and chooses not 
to seek explicitly privileged documentations and 
opinions, it will now have at its disposal a tool that 
allows it to target those tax benefits that a 
company’s managers, lawyers and accountants 
believe are susceptible to successful challenge, 
even if those parties all believe that the position has 
standing supportable by law. While decisions 
regarding tax law will ultimately be made in the 
courts, the fact that the IRS will have undue insight 
into the strength of taxpayer positions means it can 
potentially strong-arm companies into reaching 
settlements or sway a judge knowing that the 
company’s management has exposed internal 
doubts on the sustainability of a position. 
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 Of course, that the IRS merely has the ability 
to take maximal advantage of Schedule UTP 
disclosures does not mean that it will do so, just as 
not all corporations will play the “audit lottery” or 
take potentially risky tax positions simply because 
they have the option to do so. Checks on each party 
are important to maintaining the integrity of a 
taxation system born out of democratic processes 
and based on self-reported liabilities versus 
government-imposed assessments. The IRS – an 
agent of the public itself – needs to retain the ability 
to effectively audit individual and corporate 
taxpayers so that tax burdens are effected in the 
manner that the legislative branch of government 
has instructed. Similarly, taxpayers must be 
afforded the ability to dispute IRS decisions and 
have contentions resolved by a neutral third party, 
the judicial branch. These checks allow the need of 
both parties to pursue their respective interests to be 
balanced by a public-demanded fairness. 
 If the IRS is going to ask corporate taxpayers 
to disclose information intended for internal use, 
the agency should provide a similar level of 
disclosure regarding its interpretations of its own 
policies and case assessment strategies. Taxpayers 
should have plentiful opportunities to solicit 
guidance from the IRS and seek preliminary 
interpretations of policy without the possibility that 
such inquiries will color subsequent, formal 
assessments. In 2005, the IRS piloted the 
Compliance Assurance Process, a program that 
allowed some large business taxpayers to identify 
and resolve complicated tax issues prior to filing 
their tax return. The program allows the IRS to use 
audit resources more efficiently, gives the taxpayer 
more certainty and a reduced compliance burden 
and provides financial statement users with more 
precise and reliable tax information than is 
available when a company’s tax return is 
completely subject to challenge by regulatory 
agencies. The CAP, though, is currently optional 
and Schedule UTP is not. The IRS should continue 
to make guidance publicly available so that 
taxpayers, if they so choose, can satisfy themselves 
as to a tax position’s sustainability before taking the 
position and deciding whether or not to record it in 
the financial statements. 
 The issues associated with accounting for 
income taxes also need to be part of a larger, 
ongoing conversation about revisions to the U.S. 
tax code. Many cite the financial burden of 
complying with the current system and high 
marginal corporate tax rates as reasons to modify 
the system so that top marginal rates are lower but 
fewer deductions and credits are available. A 
simpler tax code could reduce the incidence of 
uncertain tax positions altogether, a trend that 
would benefit the IRS, taxpayers and financial 
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